Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

2011

Intergenerational Progress
Brett Frischmann
Mark P. McKenna
Notre Dame Law School, markmckenna@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 123 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/189

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

INTERGENERATIONAL PROGRESS
BRETT FRISCHMANN & MARK P. MCKENNA*

The Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution identifies
"Progress of Science and useful Arts" as the ends served by exclusive
rights to writings and discoveries.' Courts and scholars alike
overwhelmingly have conceived of these ends in utilitarian terms,
seeking more and better inventions and works of authorship. As a
consequence of this framing, intellectual property (IP) law relies almost
entirely on the market as the mechanism for achieving "Progress," and
we turn primarily to economics to evaluate and measure that Progress.
In this Essay, we lay the groundwork for a broader understanding of
the goals of IP law in the United States, particularly by arguing that
there is room for a normative commitment to intergenerational justice.2
First, we argue that the normative basis for IP laws need not be
utilitarianism. The Constitution does not require that we conceive of IP
in utilitarian terms or that we aim only to promote efficiency or
maximize value. To the contrary, the IP Clause leaves open a number
of ways to conceive of Progress. Courts' and scholars' overwhelming
acceptance of the utilitarian approach reflects nothing more than a
modern policy choice, one made without much, if any, deliberation. 3
*
Professor, Cardozo Law School, and Associate Professor, Notre Dame
Law School, respectively. We thank Mike Madison, Joel Reidenberg, Chris Sprigman,
Stew Sterk, Ekow Yankah, participants in the First Annual Tri-State Region IP
Workshop, and participants in the Wisconsin Law Review Symposium for their
engaging discussions on this topic and comments on our Essay.
1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power .... To

promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries . . .).

2.
This obligation could be defined in a variety of ways; it could, for
example, be to build the capacities of future generations, to improve the welfare of
future generations, or simply to preserve and pass on inherited cultural resources. We
do not take a specific position on the substantive content of the intergenerational
commitment here, but instead simply posit the existence of an intergenerational
commitment and question whether IP systems are as future regarding as they could or
should be.
3.

Think about it. Who chose utilitarianism as the normative basis for IP?

Some might argue that it emerged as the consensus view among academics, politicians,
and judges over the past half-century or so. But how did a consensus emerge? We
suspect it was socially constructed by a host of different actors pursuing their own
political and other agendas and that it dominates and persists because it is intuitive, at
least at a basic level, and provides for more easily measured outcomes than alternatives.
In this respect, the utilitarian model of IP reminds us of Benoit Godin's study of the
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Second, we argue that acceptance of the utilitarian frame has led
too easily to reliance on markets as the exclusive mechanism for
achieving Progress. The fact that IP rights (as means) rely on markets
(or market exploitation of the rights) does not mean that success in
achieving the ends of "Progress of Science and the useful Arts" is or
should be defined entirely by markets. Both IP rights and markets are
merely means, and while copyright and patent laws determine the
existence and shape of many markets, the ends of IP policy nonetheless
include market and non-market values. This is important because, as
Frischmann has discussed in detail elsewhere, economics-IP's primary
methodology-struggles mightily with non-market values and various
types of externalities associated with intellectual resources. 4
To be clear, we are not arguing that a utilitarian policy focus is
entirely wrong or that economics has no value in evaluating the IP
system. Rather, we argue the conventional wisdom that utilitarianism is
the sole normative basis for IP law rests on a very weak foundation, yet
acceptance of this view has had a dramatic impact on the path of IP law
and discourse. Because it relies so heavily on the market, and because
the market is inherently short-sighted, IP is less future regarding than it
could be. This is disappointing because the subject matter of IP makes
it particularly susceptible to the promotion of intergenerational
progress. Unlike tangible assets, inventions and works of authorship
can be consumed non-rivalrously and can be used as productive inputs
for a wide range of additional works. The subject matter of IP, then,
linear model of innovation. Benoit Godin, The Linear Model of Innovation: The
HistoricalConstruction of an Analytical Framework, 31 Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES
639 (2006). Godin shows how:
[T]he linear model is not an actual scientific model of innovation or
intellectual progress at all. . . . Rather, a host of different actors-scientists
seeking funding, economists advising government agencies, etc.constructed the linear model of innovation to classify research activities,
establish a connection between basic and applied research and eventually
commercial activities, and advance political and other agendas....
[Despite the fact that] the linear model has been roundly criticized and
rejected, [and] as Nathan Rosenberg claimed in 1994, "Everyone knows
that the linear model of innovation is dead,' it remains intact in the
discourse.

. .

. [A]lternative models have struggled to replace the linear

model because they pose more difficult measurement issues, and 'with their
multiple feedback loops look more like modern artwork or 'a plate of
spaghetti and meatballs' than a useful analytical framework.'
BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 275-76).
4.
Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright
Law, 3 REv. L. & ECON. 649 (2007); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its
ConceptualBoundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 801 (2009); Brett M. Frischmann &
Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257 (2007).
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could be leveraged much more effectively to build the capacities of
future generations. We believe, for example, that IP law itself could
promote intergenerational equity by making more space for productive
use of intellectual assets, shortening terms of protection, or otherwise
limiting the scope of IP rights. But policymakers could also account for
short-sightedness embedded within the IP system by being more futureregarding in the other policies they adopt in conjunction with IP
protection-for example, in funding university and nonprofit
infrastructure and awarding grants for basic research.
In this Essay we begin to explore the feasibility of incorporating an
intergenerational commitment into IP policy. We do so both for its own
sake and as an important illustrative example of the wider range of ends
IP could be structured to promote. Our feasibility inquiry raises two
deeply contested philosophical questions:
(1) What, if any, is the normative basis for intergenerational
commitments?
(2) What, if any, is the normative basis for U.S. copyright
and patent laws?
We do not answer either question comprehensively here. Instead,
for purposes of this Essay, we address the first question by adopting a
rather broad conception of intergenerational justice, which we refer to
generically as Intergenerational Progress. With this conception in mind,
we dispute the conventional wisdom about the second question;
specifically, we challenge the notion that the constitutionally prescribed
ends for copyright and patent laws, namely "Progress in Science and
the useful Arts," must be understood in utilitarian terms. We suggest
that, while it does impose some limits, the IP Clause of the Constitution
is open to a range of normative values whose advancement would
constitute Progress. Moreover, we argue, the conventional wisdom that
the IP Clause is necessarily utilitarian has deleterious yet unexamined
consequences, for both current and future generations. In the end, we
conclude that a normative commitment to intergenerational justice is
compatible with Progress, whether or not such a commitment is
grounded in utilitarianism.
I. WHAT Do WE MEAN BY INTERGENERATIONAL PROGRESS?

There are various theories of intergenerational justice, equity, and
obligation. On some accounts, for example, the present generation is
morally obligated to save or invest so as to allow future people to live
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under "just conditions."' Others take a more limited view, suggesting
that the present generation merely has an obligation to transmit to
future generations the "fundamental blessings" it inherited.6 Even on
that view, we must acknowledge,' and probably preserve, the
intellectual and cultural resources we have received from
past generations.'
Again, we do not fully defend a particular theory of
intergenerational equity here. For purposes of this Essay we make the
more limited claim that the welfare of future generations matters-and
should matter-to the present generation.9 We do so in recognition of
5.
Rawls suggests that "just conditions" are "the conditions needed to
establish and to preserve a just basic structure over time." JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 159 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). According to Rawls, once
sufficient conditions for "just institutions" to be secure exist, then the present
generation is not obligated to save for the future but must sustain the conditions
necessary for future people to live under just institutions and must transmit at least the
equivalent of the blessings it has received from the previous generation. See John
Rawls,
STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
§ 4.9 (2008),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entires/rawls/.
6.
Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address
Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Ill. (Jan. 27, 1838), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 76, 76 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946) (referring to
"fundamental blessings").
7.
As Blaise Pascal wrote:
It is in this manner that we may at the present day adopt different
sentiments and new opinions, without despising the ancients and without
ingratitude, since the first knowledge which they have given us has served
as a stepping-stone to our own, and since in these advantages we are
indebted to them for our ascendency over them; because being raised by
their aid to a certain degree, the slightest effort causes us to mount still

higher, and with less pains and less glory we find ourselves above them.
Thence it is that we are enabled to discover things which it was impossible
for them to perceive. Our view is more extended, and although they knew
as well as we all that they could observe in nature, they did not,
nevertheless, know it so well, and we see more than they.
BLAISE PASCAL, THOUGHTS, LETTERS, AND OPUSCULES 548 (O.W. Wight trans.,
Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company 1893) (1859) (emphasis omitted).
8.
See Michael J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv.

(forthcoming 2011).
This assumption may be a stretch, if the present generation's actions
9.
reflect its values. See Brett M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and
IntergenerationalEquity, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 457 (2005). Still, as Edith Brown Weiss
demonstrates, intergenerational stewardship duties are "supported by a robust set of
cultural, political, legal and religious traditions." EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO
AND
PATRIMONY,
COMMON
LAW,
INTERNATIONAL
FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERGENERATIONAL EQuITY (1989); Frischmann, supra, at 461 (citing Edith Brown
Weiss, IntergenerationalEquity: Toward an InternationalLegal Famework, in GLOBAL
ACCORD: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 333, 336-42
(Nazli Choucri ed., 1993) (describing roots "in the common and civil law traditions, in
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the inherent interdependence of generations that is implicit in the wellknown notion that we "stand on the shoulders of giants.""o That
metaphor is most often used to emphasize the cumulative nature of
cultural or scientific progress," but the expression also reflects an
understanding of intergenerational dependence. Each generation is both
dwarf and giant; the current generation stands on the shoulders of the
past and also serves as the shoulders for the future.12 The nature of this
interdependence among generations, its relationship to intellectual
progress, and the moral duties generations might owe each other are
quite complex issues," and we plan to explore them in more detail in
future work.
Accordingly, we leave aside here a host of philosophical and
related implementation considerations, such as how to approach
discounting or how to treat unborn persons. Our goal is simply to make
the case that there is room for intergenerational equity at the IP policy
table. IP systems shape the ways generations build upon, use, and
interact with cultural, scientific, and other types of intellectual
resources. Yet decisions about how to structure IP systems do not take
explicit and meaningful account of the interests of future generations.
We find this disappointing but not surprising.
In a sense, society has conflated the means and ends in IP,
delegating decisions about what types of cultural, scientific, and
Islamic law, in African customary law, and in Asian nontheistic traditions," as well as
Judeo-Christian tradition, socialist legal tradition, and international law)).
Various scholars have studied the intellectual history of the metaphor and
10.
how its usage has evolved over time. While the modern usage may elevate the dwarf
(or pygmy) to stress the superiority of the present, historical usage, for example in the
Middle Ages, revered the accomplishment of the ancients. See, e.g., REBECCA MOORE
AUTHORS,
IN THE SHADOW OF GIANTS: PLAGIARISTS,
STANDING
HOWARD,
COLLABORATORS 65-66 (1999) (discussing the historical instability of the metaphor);
ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965).

Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
11.
Research and the PatentLaw, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991) ("Most innovators stand
on the shoulders of giants . . . .").
Ct WILLIAM R. SHEA, DESIGNING EXPERIMENTS & GAMES OF CHANCE:
12.
THE UNCONVENTIONAL SCIENCE OF BLAISE PASCAL 191 (2003) ("We do not honor the

Ancients because of their antiquity for it is rather we who are the ancients. The world is
older now and we have more experience." (attributing the quote to Descartes)).
Keep in mind that the metaphor involves a dwarf looking out and
13.
observing from the vantage point of a giant's shoulder. Without the giant, the dwarf
would be able to observe much less and would have to exert more effort walking about.
With the giant's assistance, the dwarf's sight ranges far and wide. As the giant walks
about, perhaps meandering randomly, perhaps walking along a path, different views of
the world are revealed to the dwarf. Much more ground can be covered. The metaphor
is intriguing and raises a number of other interesting questions about and perspectives
on intergenerational interdependence and progress, which we leave aside for purposes
of this Essay and hope to explore in the future.
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intellectual progress we want to "the market." To the extent the welfare
of future generations matters, we have assumed that future generations
inevitably will benefit from whatever progress the market brings
through economic growth and technological advancement.
There is obviously some logic to such an approach, and we do not
mean to deny that IP systems optimally designed to facilitate markets
would lead to progress and improve the welfare of future generations at
least in some respects. Our argument is that progress need not, and
indeed should not, be conceived of in linear, binary terms (more
progress or less). Progress instead should be seen as contextual, in the
sense that progress takes place within a particular information
ecosystem, and the defining characteristics of that ecosystem shape the
path along which we progress. To return to the giant and dwarf
metaphor, tying the IP system to the market sets the giant walking on a
particular path, one dictated by the cravings of the dwarf. Surely the
dwarf (present generation) perched on the giant's shoulders (past
generations' blessings) sees more if the giant walks along some path
than if the giant stays still. But that does not tell us about the relative
value of different paths, or even whether it might be possible to see
down multiple paths at the same time. It is, in other words, not clear
we should commit the future to the path dictated by our current
cravings. Perhaps we can do better, both for ourselves and future
generations.
II. THE NORMATIVE BASIS FOR U.S. COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAWS
There is widespread consensus among scholars that patent and
copyright laws, at least in the United States, are fundamentally
utilitarian.' 4 As Madhavi Sunder notes, "[u]nlike its cousins property
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
14.
CARDOzo L. REV. 2821, 2831 (2006) ("The overall assessment of intellectual
property's instrumental goal-the promotion of 'Progress,' at least in the U.S.
context-has been dominated of late by the assumption that pure wealth or utilitymaximization serves adequately to evaluate social welfare."); Linda R. Cohen & Roger
G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv.
453, 461 (2001) ("[T]he conceptual model underlying American intellectual property
law is utilitarian: rights are granted for social objectives (advancing knowledge and
producing useful products)."); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1659, 1688 (1988) [hereinafter Fisher, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine] ("The utilitarian theory ... is undoubtedly the most venerable
and oft-cited of the justifications for the American law of intellectual property.");
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS INTHE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169 (2001) (describing utilitarian theory as the
"most popular" theory of IP); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the
Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (2004) ("The literature on the granting of
. Intellectual
interests in tangible property is replete with utilitarian accounts...
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law and the First Amendment, which bear the weight of values such as
autonomy, culture, equality, and democracy, in the United States
intellectual property is understood almost exclusively as being about
incentives. Its theory is utilitarian, but with the maximand simply
creative output.""
There are, of course, some notable exceptions to this rule,
particularly with respect to copyright law.16 Neil Netanel, for example,
has characterized copyright as a mechanism for enhancing the
democratic character of civil society. 17 Justin Hughes has articulated a
variety of philosophical frames for IP.'" Others, including Adam
Mossoff, have argued that natural rights theories have played important
roles in shaping IP doctrines." And some have relied on non-utilitarian
arguments in favor of moral rights protections, though generally not to
the exclusion of a general utilitarian framework. 20 Nevertheless, it is
fair to say that the utilitarian view of IP dominates and that alternative

property is no different. . . . The economic emphasis in current American intellectual
property is equally utilitarian at heart. Scholars who debate whether intellectual
property grants are too broad or too narrow for the public interest are using the felicific
calculus as their normative ground. Even the Supreme Court has invoked utilitarianism
in deciding intellectual property cases dealing with copyright and with patent."
(footnotes omitted)); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1032 (2005) (rejecting an anti-free-riding norm in IP
and arguing that we "are better off with the traditional utilitarian explanation for
intellectual property"); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L.
1105,
1107-10 (1990) (describing the purpose of copyright law
REV.
as utilitarian).
15.
Madhavi Sunder, IP 3 , 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 259 (2006)
(footnote omitted).
16.
Cf Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REv. 1575, 1597 (2003) ("To a greater extent than any other area of intellectual
property, courts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law
is utilitarian.")
17.
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008); see also Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyrght and a DemocraticCivil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 364
(1996) (noting that copyright is "in, but not of, the market").
18.
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J.
287 (1988).
19.
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An
Intellectual History, 1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257, 1313-15 (2001); see
also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the NaturalLaw of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993)
(arguing that "a properly conceived natural-rights theory of intellectual property would
provide significant protection for free speech interests"); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517 (1990)
(calling for a "restoration of the natural law to our copyright jurisprudence"
(footnote omitted)).
See, e.g., ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY:
20.
FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010).
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theories have had relatively little effect on policy in recent years.
Indeed, students of IP over the last several decades probably take the
utilitarian view for granted, as most of the leading textbooks present IP
policy considerations predominantly in utilitarian terms. 2 1 Indeed, they
frequently proceed to link IP explicitly to the market, focusing on the
conventional public-goods story.22

For many, the utilitarian frame is mandated by constitutional text,
which articulates Congress's IP power in means-end language:
"Congress

shall have the power .

.

. To promote the Progress of

Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 23 Peter Menell, for example, argues that "[t]he United
States Constitution expressly conditions the grant of power to Congress
to create patent and copyright laws upon a utilitarian
foundation . . . ."24 Yochai Benkler takes a similar view, asserting that

"[t]he Intellectual Property Clause itself states a utilitarian purpose: It
permits grants of exclusive rights for limited times only and states its
purpose as a social, not individual, one '[tlo promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts."' 25
See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION
6-7 (3d ed. 2010) (describing copyright as a solution to the public-goods
problem, a "purely utilitarian purpose," and suggesting that "the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution embraced this utilitarian rationale for copyright protection"); id. at 12 n.3
(noting that, despite "pronounced strains of Lockean labor theory in U.S. copyright
law," "in the U.S., the utilitarian justification for copyright protection predominates, as
evidenced by the constitutional grant of authority"); CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT
LAW 3 (8th ed. 2010) (noting that "conventional accounts" of copyright "start with the
proposition that, from the beginning, our statutes have reflected an assumption that
unimpeded copying . . . would produce undesirable social consequences," and that the
"focus of American copyright law is primarily on the benefits derived by the public
from the labors of the authors, and only secondarily on the desirability . . . of
providing a reward to the author or copyright owner," but also acknowledging that, in
reality, the situation is "considerably more complicated" because of a variety of
theories of copyright).
See, e.g., MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND
22.
MATERIALS 2 (4th ed. 2010) ("The primary purpose of intellectual property law is to
ensure a rich, diverse and competitive marketplace. To achieve this purpose,
intellectual property doctrines all provide property rights as incentives to individuals
who create new products, services or works of art or literature."); COHEN ET AL., SUpra
note 21, at 6-7.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23.
24.
Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2
21.

ECONOMY

ENCYCLOPEDIA

OF LAW AND

ECONOMICS: CIVIL LAW AND

ECONOMICs

129,

130

(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy,
25.
Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 60 (2001); see also id. at 59 ("[Tlhe
basic ideological commitment of American intellectual property is actually heavily
utilitarian. . . ."); Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow ofInnovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
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Courts' statements about the purposes of IP law are perhaps open
to a broader reading, as cases frequently identify as IP's goals the
promotion of knowledge or the creation of social benefit, both of which
could be read in non-utilitarian ways. In Mazer v. Stein, for example,
the Court asserted that "ft]he economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors
in 'Science and useful Arts."' 26 In Graham v. John Deere, the Court
claimed that Thomas Jefferson "rejected a natural-rights theory in IP
rights and clearly recognized the social and economic rationale of the
patent system. The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the
inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge." 27 But however broadly
these statements, or the similar statements of many appellate courts, 28
might be construed, the utilitarian view of IP-and one that fully
commits to the market mechanism as the means to achieving Progressis on full display in the Court's recent IP cases."
2257, 2275 (2010) ("Scholars tend to agree that the utilitarian theory-the promotion of
innovation-is the prominent justification for intellectual property rights in the United
States. They tie the dominance of the utilitarian goal to the instrumental nature of the
U.S. Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause, which states that monopolies can be
conferred 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts.'"); Lastowka & Hunter,
supra note 14, at 44 ("The Constitution says that Congress may protect patents and
copyright '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' and this justification
is, of course, utilitarian."); Leval, supra note 14, at 1108 ("Several aspects of the
[constitutional] text confirm its utilitarian purpose."); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant
Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property
Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1481 (2004) ("The utilitarian, or economic,
theory is installed in the Constitution. . . . The Constitutional grant of authority
provides little guidance to Congress and very little actual limit on Congressional action,
but it clearly embodies the utilitarian theory for the protection of intellectual property."
(footnote omitted)).
26.
Mazer v. Stem, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers,Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966). For a
27.
criticism of the Supreme Court's invocation of Thomas Jefferson's views about IP, see
Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent
"Privilege"in HistoricalContext, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007).
See, e.g., Sari Louis FeraudInt'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 480
28.
n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[C]opyright laws are not 'matters of strong moral principle' but
rather represent 'economic legislation based on policy decisions that assign rights based
on assessments of what legal rules will produce the greatest economic good for society
as a whole.'"); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) ("If the
use satisfies the criteria of § 107, it is fair because it advances the utilitarian goals
of copyright.").
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) ("Accordingly,
29.
'copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from
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This understanding of IP's normative premises, however, is not
compelled by the text or history of the IP Clause. As a textual matter,
the IP Clause is undeniably instrumental; it links a goal (promoting
Progress) with a particular means (exclusive rights). It may even be
consequentialist in orientation, though that is disputable. 3 0 But whatever
version of utilitarianism one adopts, the common principle is that
priority-in ranking, (e)valuation, decision making, etc.-is given to
states of affairs that maximize the aggregate utility of society, where
utility is measured by happiness, pleasure, or desire fulfillment (or
some comparable measure). 3 1 Nothing in the text of the IP Clause
compels us to conceive of Progress in these terms. Nor does the fact
that IP systems are designed for public benefit or welfare, as the
Supreme Court has reminded us, 32 mean that "benefit" or "welfare"
must be equated with utility (happiness, pleasure, or preference
satisfaction). Put another way, the end of "Progress in Science and the
useful Arts" could be, but certainly does not have to be, read to
embody the central normative objective of utilitarianism-maximizing
utility (however measured).
Nor does the available historical evidence compel the conclusion
that the Framers intended the Clause to be understood in utilitarian
the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the
proliferation of knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the

Rewarding authors for their creative labor and
progress of science.'
'promoting . . . Progress' are thus complementary . . . ." (quoting Am. Geophysical
Union v.Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (2nd
Cir. 1994); THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961))); N. Y. Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 496 n.3 (2001) ("Congress'
adjustment of the author/publisher balance is a permissible expression of the 'economic
philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause],' i.e., 'the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort [motivated] by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare.'" (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 558, (1985))).
30.
It is disputable because one can argue reasonably that the means matter
considerably in IP. That is why the IP clause specifies the means (exclusive rights) with
limitations (limited times).
Utilitarianism is a very complicated branch of philosophy, though most of
31.
the complications are irrelevant here. For an accessible overview, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 008: Utilitarianism, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON,
(last
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal-theory lexicon/2003/1 /legal-theoryle_4.html
modified Aug. 15, 2010). See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861),
reprintedin 10 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 203 (J.M. Robson ed., Univ.
of Toronto Press 1969).
32.
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) ("Rather, the limited grant [of copyright] is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative
activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired.").
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terms. As Diane Zimmerman recently chronicled, copyright theory at
the time of the founding was "torn among inconsistent and conflicting
suppositions about its purpose, about the relative importance to it of the
natural rights claims of authors and about the strength of society's claim
to greater freedom to share in and utilize new expression and ideas.""
To take just one thread, it is clear that at least some part of the
motivation for the IP Clause was a determination to promote general
civic improvement and education.34 This might explain why Dotan
Oliar was able to conclude that the IP Clause combines elements of
several proposed powers, including an education power and a power to
grant encouragements." It is also consistent with James Wilson's
suggestion "that government's primary objective" is not protection of
property, as some of his contemporaries believed, but is instead "the
cultivation and improvement of the human mind." 36 And while the
goals of civic improvement, education, or cultivation of the human
mind could be conceived of in broadly utilitarian terms, all of them
could at least as easily be, and frequently were, understood as goods in
and of themselves.
It is also clear that natural rights theories played some role in early
understandings of IP rights, even if those theories have tended to take a
back seat over time." In fact, notwithstanding the modern consensus
about the theoretical basis for IP, an economic utilitarian framework
would have made IP a pretty significant outlier at a time in which the
economic approach to legal rights was essentially unheard of. We think
it is much more likely that the modern consensus is actually a product
of the rise of law and economics over the last several decades.

33.
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Statute of Anne and its Progeny:
Variations Without a Theme, 47 Hous. L. REV. 965, 981 (2010) [hereinafter
Zimmerman, The Statute of Anne]; see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights
as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 29 (2011)
[hereinafter Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives].
34.
Zimmerman, The Statute ofAnne, supra note 33, at 984.
35.
Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57
UCLA L. REV. 421, 448 (2009) (arguing based on various proposed clauses that "the
text of the Progress Clause and the Clause's overall ends-means structure were adapted
from three proposals . . . namely Pinckney's Education Power and Madison's and
Pinckney's Encouragements Powers"); see also id. at 447 tbl.1 (showing
proposed powers).
36.
Id. at 449 (citing James Madison's Journal (July 13, 1787), in I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 605 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
("[Wilson] could not agree that property was the sole or the primary object of Governt.
& Society. The cultivation & improvement of the human mind was the most
noble object.").
37.
Mossoff, supra note 19; Zimmerman, The Statute ofAnne, supranote 33,
at 988-89.
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But evaluating IP rights in non-utilitarian terms should not be
remarkable; in fact, a wide range of policy discussions, including those
relating to First Amendment values, are framed in non-utilitarian terms
and rely overwhelmingly on non-market values. No one thinks that the
case for religious freedom, for example, has to be made in utilitarian
terms. Indeed, we think it would be self-evidently strange to suggest
that people should have the right to free exercise only to the extent such
freedom maximizes society's utility, just as we cannot imagine much
support for parceling out the right to freely exercise one's religion
through a market mechanism. We similarly do not hang our support for
the freedom to engage in political speech, or to be tried by a jury of
one's peers, on an assessment of the incentive effects of such
protections.
The point is not that the interests of future generations in
intellectual resources are as weighty as these constitutional rightsthough we happen to believe that they frequently touch, and sometimes
are intimately intertwined with, those constitutional rights. Our point is
that the orthodoxy of utilitarian IP is much less about the nature of
intellectual resources than the fact that this frame has become orthodox.
There is no reason why IP policy must, or should, be conceived of
strictly in utilitarian terms.
We suspect that most who claim the IP Clause is utilitarian really
are just using "utilitarian" as a synonym for "instrumental," or that
they are, perhaps unwittingly, oversimplifying to avoid the substantial
complications a genuine utilitarian calculus would entail. But such
casual (sloppy) substitution of utilitarianism for instrumentalism can
have significant consequences. Specifically, the erroneous belief that
the end of Progress in Science and the useful Arts must be conceived of
in utilitarian terms has had a profound effect on patent and copyright
laws. Three general implications seem quite apparent:
First, non-utilitarian theories of IP, such as natural-rights theories,
are marginalized if not outright rejected.3 ' Not only has this relegated
existing non-utilitarian theories of IP to second-class status, but it has
also stunted the development of new non-utilitarian theories of IP, Neil

38.
See David McGowan, Copynght Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REv.
1, 2-3, 71-72 (2004) (describing the difficulties entailed in utilitarian analysis of IP and
observing that, as a result of these difficulties, many people end up falling back on their
assumptions or on first principles and simply couching those arguments in utilitarian
terms). McGowan himself ultimately falls back on a Lockean labor theory to justify IP.
Id. at 3, 7, 38.
39.
See, e.g., Fisher, Reconstructing the FairUse Doctrine, supranote 14, at
1687-88 (1988) ("The utilitarian theory . . . is undoubtedly the most venerable and oftcited of the justifications for the American law of intellectual property.").
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Netanel's excellent scholarship notwithstanding.' We believe there is
plenty of room at the table for new instrumental, consequentialist,
and/or welfarist theories of IP.
Second, economics "provide[s] the principal framework for
analyzing intellectual property." 4' This turns out to be a very
complicated point. We recognize that utilitarianism and economics are
overlapping sets; there are utilitarian approaches that do not rely on
economics, just as economics is not always utilitarian. We also
recognize that a particular subset of economics, neoclassical economics,
dominates here. Why economics appears to be the principal framework
is also a complicated question. It may be due to broader social and
political movements in the United States; it may be due to the rise of
cost-benefit analysis in policy and regulatory settings; it may be due to
the demand for quantification, measurement, and other such
deliverables.42
Whatever the causes, as a descriptive matter, we think it is clear
that most scholars move immediately from the claim that IP is
fundamentally utilitarian to articulating the policy considerations
explicitly in economic terms.43 In fact, many use language suggesting

See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyrght Within the First
40.
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2001); Netanel, supra note 17; see also
Sunder, supra note 15, at 259-60 ("To put it bluntly, there are no 'giant-sized'
intellectual property theories capable of accommodating the full range of human values
implicit in intellectual production. But there should be." (footnotes omitted)).
Menell, supra note 24, at 130; Sunder, supra note 15, at 261 ("Despite
41.
these real world changes, intellectual property scholars increasingly explain their field
through the lens of economics.... [Liegal scholars continue to understand intellectual
property as solely a tool to solve an economic 'public goods' problem . . . .").
Cf Chon, supranote 14, at 2831 ("The overall assessment of intellectual
42.
property's instrumental goal-the promotion of 'Progress,' at least in the U.S.
context-has been dominated of late by the assumption that pure wealth or utilitymaximization serves adequately to evaluate social welfare. Reliance on these metrics
can be explained by an analogy to a drunk looking for his keys under a streetlight: since
it is extremely difficult to measure how intellectual property affects rates of innovation,
policy-makers tend to over-rely on rough proxies that can be measured, such as the
'bottom line' of economic growth or losses, or net trade balances or deficits."). Much
of Chon's critique resonates with us, particularly since she notes that the utilitarian
economic approach creates the potential for conflict between society's short- and longterm interests. See id. ("This approach dovetails with the interests of intellectual
property industries, whose short term goals of maximizing revenue generation are not
necessarily aligned with society's long term dynamic goals of maximizing
innovation.").
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copynght: A Study of
43.
Copynght in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REV. 281,
291 (1970) ("If we are to justify copyright protection, we must turn to its
economic objectives.").
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that the economic-incentive approach is utilitarian." One leading IP
textbook, for example, claims that "[t]he principal basis for [IP]
protection in the United States is the utilitarian or economic incentive
framework." 45 In fact, the same casebook ties the economic account of
IP law to the Framers, essentially attributing to them the public-goods
narrative frequently used to justify IP."
Third, the means and ends in IP are conflated and normative
decisions about the path of Progress in Science and the useful Arts are
effectively delegated to the market (or the cravings of the current
generation). The Supreme Court demonstrated this point succinctly in
Eldred v. Ashcroft,47 when it said "[t]he profit motive is the engine that
ensures the progress of science.""
For these reasons, we think those concerned about
intergenerational equity should be concerned about the dominance of
the utilitarian conception of IP. This is not to say that adhering to a
utilitarian view of Progress would necessarily preclude a commitment
to intergenerational equity. Some philosophers and economists have, in
fact, developed utilitarian conceptions of intergenerational equity.49
To close the loop, some even attribute this utilitarian/economic theory to
44.
the constitutional text. See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 25, at 1481 ("The utilitarian, or
economic, theory is installed in the Constitution. Article 1, section 8, clause 8 provides
that 'Congress shall have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.'"); see also Lastowka & Hunter, supra
note 14, at 44-45 ("The Constitution says that Congress may protect patents and
copyright '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' and this justification
is, of course, utilitarian. The economic emphasis in current American intellectual
property is equally utilitarian at heart. Scholars who debate whether intellectual
property grants are too broad or too narrow for the public interest are using the felicific
calculus as their normative ground." (footnotes omitted)).
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
45.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2 (5th ed. 2010). The
authors do note that "other theories - most notably the natural rights and personhood
justifications - have been important in understanding the development and scope of
intellectual property law." Id.
Id. at 12 (noting that "[t]o understand why the Framers thought exclusive
46.
rights in inventions and creations would promote the public welfare, consider what
would happen absent any sort of intellectual property protection" and then proceeding
to describe how inventions are costly to create but easy to copy and therefore might be
undersupplied absent the artificial scarcity created by IP law).
47.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Id. at 212 n.18 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F.
48.
Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
49.
For an accessible synopsis, see Axel Gosseries, Theories of

Intergenerational

Justice:

A

http://sapiens.revues.org/indexl65.html;

Synopsis,

1

S.A.P.I.EN.S

(2008),

see also Geir B. Asheim & Wolfgang

Buchholz, The Malleability of Undiscounted Utilitarianism as a Citerion of
IntergenerationalJustice, 70 ECONOMICA 405 (2003).
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But we resist a utilitarian conception of intergenerational equity for
at least two reasons. First, intellectual and cultural resources play a
foundational role in building individuals' capabilities to participate in a
variety of social systems, including economic, cultural, political, and
educational systems."o The value associated both with such capabilities
and, when utilized, public participation in such systems is often quite
difficult to capture in utilitarianism, and in particular, its primary mode
of expression and analysis in policy setting, economics." There may be
many different types of externalities involved, and it can be incredibly
difficult if not impossible to measure the aggregate social value.
Elsewhere, Frischmann has tried to work within economics while
addressing these boundary problems. He has recognized that
"[a]nalytically, the challenge in employing economics derives from the
difficulties in capturing benefits and costs realized in noneconomic
systems (but caused by or at least related to actions in economic
systems)." 5 2 This is a major part of Amartya Sen's motivation for
developing the capabilities approach." We are not specifically
advocating a capabilities approach here, though that approach resonates
with us in a number of ways. We emphasize that the IP Clause is not
necessarily utilitarian in order to make room for a normative
commitment to an end other than maximizing social welfare in a strictly
utilitarian sense.
We also are skeptical of a utilitarian conception of
intergenerational equity because it raises enormously difficult problems
of discounting.5 4 In one sense, a utilitarian approach could lead to an
overwhelming and stifling burden on the present generation to invest: if
we assume an infinite number of future generations with populations at

50.
On how ideas play this role, see Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers,
and the FirstAmendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301, 311-16.
51.
See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
52.
Frischmann, Spillovers Theory, supra note 4, at 819.
53.
See SEN, supra note 51, at 70-71. The capabilities approach comprises a
normative evaluation framework influenced by economics but focused on capabilities
rather than utility. Capabilities are opportunities or freedoms to realize actual, "reallife" achievements, or what Sen refers to as "functionalities." Sen deliberately
emphasizes the importance of the real opportunities that people have in life and is
unabashedly normative. Sen, Nussbaum, and others employing the capabilities
approach write about, inter alia, how society is, or would be, better off "investing" in
the capabilities of individuals to be and do what they have reason to value. We discuss
the capabilities approach elsewhere.
54.
See, e.g., Asheim & Buchholz, supra note 49; John Broome, Discounting
the Future, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 128 (1994); Giancarlo Marini & Pasquale
Scaramozzino, Social Time Preference, 13 J. POPULATION ECON. 639 (2000); Mancur
Olson & Martin J. Bailey, Positive Time Preference, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 1 (1981); F. P.
Ramsey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 544 (1928).

138

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

least equal to that of the present generation, then one can imagine the
utilitarian calculus pushing the present generation to invest everything
for the future, except for resources necessary to meet the present
generation's basic needs." One may avoid these results" by applying a
positive discount rate to the interests of future generations, but that
would require us to have some method for choosing the appropriate
discount rate, which raises a fundamental, perhaps intractable (moral)
question because of the dramatic effect the discount rate can have on
the substantive obligations."
CONCLUSION: WHY INTERGENERATIONAL PROGRESS?

Our preliminary view is that IP systems are a particularly
interesting, especially attractive (even efficient), and legally and
politically viable means by which society can invest in the future.
During the Symposium at the Wisconsin Law School, we presented the
following five-step argument:
(1) Intergenerational Progress, or a commitment to
improving the welfare of future generations, is compatible
with Progress in Science and the useful Arts;
(2) IP systems are especially attractive means for serving the
end of Intergenerational Progress because of the resources
(subject matter) involved;
(3) IP systems may struggle to serve the end of
Intergenerational Progress because IP rights are designed to
See, e.g., Intergenerational Justice, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
55.
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/ (last updated
Feb. 26, 2008). Parfitt, Sidgwick, and many others have considered this issue. See id.;
see also DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 223-24 (1990) (failure to discount would (i) leave all
generations at a subsistence level of existence because benefits would be postponed
perpetually for the future and (ii) lead to cost-benefit analysis favoring rules that impose
excessive sacrifices on the current generation); Douglas Kysar, Discounting . . . on
Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 119 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On
Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and IntergenerationalEquity, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 171, 199-200 (2007) (discussing discounting in the context of regulatory
cost-benefit analyses).
There are other ways out of this conundrum, but to our knowledge, not
56.
within a utilitarian framework.
57.
The significant consequences of choosing the discount rate is well
illustrated in the debate among economists about climate change. Compare NICHOLAS
STERN, THE ECONOMICS Of CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REvIEw (2007), with
William Nordhaus, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (May 3,
available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu2007) (unpublished manuscript),
stem_050307.pdf.
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enable and encourage market-driven investments and the
market system introduces countervailing present-oriented
influences (shortsightedness);
(4) The potential conflict between (2) and (3) can be, and to
a degree is, resolved by institutional design, by constructing
complex, mixed regimes of private property rights and public
commons; and
(5) To the extent that institutional design within the IP
systems does not fully resolve the conflict between (2) and (3)
and IP systems are insufficient means to promote
Intergenerational Progress, society may turn to other
institutions, such as public funding of research, which may or
may not require some degree of coordination with IP.
We realize that each of these steps raises a host of contested issues
and complications." It was not possible to resolve them all in this
Essay. Accordingly, we focused primarily on the first step. In future
work, we plan to examine the others.

58.

Admittedly, we knew what we were getting into.
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